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In re Marriage of Simmons:
A Case for Transsexual Marriage Recognition
Katie D. Fletcher*
mentored by Judge Lola Maddox**
I. INTRODUCTION
It's a girl! It's a boy! At birth, every individual is identified as either
male or female, usually by visual examination.1 Gender and sex are
typically unambiguous and most people consider them the same.2 The
* J.D., Loyola University Chicago, expected January 2007. Mom and Carol, thank you for your
never-ending love and support, you both inspire and spur me. This Article would not be what it is
today without the invaluable assistance from the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
editorial board and members. Additionally, special thanks and gratitude to the Honorable Judge
Maddox for providing insight and for encouraging and challenging me throughout the process.
Finally, this Article would not have been possible without contributions in many different forms
and for that I am grateful to Professor Cynthia Ho and Jody Marksamer.
** Judge Lola Maddox is a Circuit Judge of the Third Judicial Circuit in Illinois having been
appointed by the Supreme Court to fill a vacancy from March 1, 2006 to December 4, 2006. She
had retired from the judicial system on November 30, 2004 after more than twenty-five years as
an Associate Judge where she served in many capacities including Chief Associate Judge and
Supervising Judge of the Family and Law Magistrate Divisions. Judge Maddox worked as a pro
bono volunteer for the Land of Lincoln Legal Assistance Foundation in Alton, Illinois during her
short retirement. Judge Maddox has received numerous accolades during her tenure as a Judge
including the Third Judicial Circuit Family Violence Coordinating Council "Partners in Peace"
Award in 1999, Civic Award from Alton NAACP in 1998 for outstanding and dedicated work in
the court system, Woman of Distinction Award in 2004 from Edwardsville Business and
Professional Women, Chair of the Third Judicial Circuit Domestic Violence Coordinating
Council from 1996 to 2004, and Chief Judge's Representative to the Madison County Juvenile
Justice Council Planning Committee.
1. Alyson Dodi Meiselman, Katrina C. Rose & Phyllis Randolph Frye, Cause of Action for
Legal Change of Gender, 24 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 135, 139 (2004); see also HOWARD W.
JONES, JR. & WILLIAM WALLACE SCOTT, HERMAPHRODITISM, GENITAL ANOMALIES AND
RELATED ENDOCRINE DISORDERS 55 (1958) (explaining that the obstetrician determines the
baby's sex by observation of the external genitalia); Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and
Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 271
(1999) (explaining that the birth certificate sex designation is determined by a birth attendant).
2. Ruth Bader Ginsburg was in large part responsible for the fact that the law uses the words
.,sex" and "gender" interchangeably resulting in an unfortunate terminological gap.
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law presumes that these terms are interchangeable, but generally the law
is concerned with a person's legal sex. 3  For transsexual individuals,
this can be a problem because, although a person's legal sex is the sex
assigned at birth, a transsexual individual identifies himself or herself as
the sex opposite that assigned at birth.
4
When a child is born, a birth attendant makes a sex assignment
decision based on the external physical features of the child.
5
Unfortunately, any incongruence between biological factors and other
factors, whether biological or psychological, may go unnoticed at the
time of the designation. 6 For most individuals, their birth-assigned sex
is not a problem, but for others it may be-specifically, it may be a
problem for transsexual individuals who had their sex assigned by
readily observable physical features at birth.7 Transsexual individuals
According to Ginsburg, "[f]or impressionable minds the word 'sex' may conjure up
improper images" of what occurs in porno theaters. Therefore, she stopped talking
about sex discrimination years ago .... [S]he explained that a secretary once told her,
"I'm typing all these briefs and articles for you and the word sex, sex, sex, is on every
page. Don't you know those nine men [on the Supreme Court], they hear that word
and their first association is not the way you want them to be thinking? Why don't you
use the word 'gender'? It is a grammatical term and it will ward off distracting
associations."
Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate
Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1995).
3. See Greenberg, supra note 1, at 267 (stating that the law usually finds the terms "male" and
"female" unambiguous and fixed).
4. Some states do not allow a change of sex on a birth certificate even after sex-reassignment
surgery. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203(d) (2005) (stating a birth certificate will not be
changed as a result of sex change surgery).
5. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 271.
6. Id. at 271 & n.27.
7. Id. at 271-72. Based on the appearance of the person's external genitalia, a person's legal
sex is generally fixed at birth. In the presence of ambiguous genitalia, medical professionals
usually suggest surgery to fix the genitalia so that they appear clearly male or female.
The presence of an "adequate" penis in an XY infant leads to the label male, while the
absence of an adequate penis leads to the label female. A genetic male with an
inadequate penis (one that is incapable of penetrating a female's vagina) is "turned
into" a female even if it means destroying his reproductive capacity. A genetic female
who may be capable of reproducing, however, is generally assigned the female sex to
preserve her reproductive capability regardless of the appearance of her external
genitalia. If her "phallus" is considered to be "too large" to meet the guidelines for a
typical clitoris, it is surgically reduced even if it means that her capacity for
satisfactory sex may be reduced or destroyed. In other words, men are defined based
upon their ability to penetrate females and females are defined based upon their ability
to procreate. Sex, therefore, can be viewed as a social construct rather than a
biological fact.
Id.; but see Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma:
Should Physicians Perform Sex Assignment Surgery on Infants with Ambiguous Genitalia?, 7
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2000) (questioning the medical practice of early surgery on infants
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face numerous difficulties as they try to lead their lives as their
identified sex while the law views them as the opposite sex.
8
For clarity and consistency, this Article uses certain terms in the
following manner. "Sex" represents the generally accepted biological
attributes, such as gonads, genitalia, chromosomes, and hormones, and
"gender" describes the biological aspect of sex in the brain.9
"Transsexual" includes the term transgender' ° and refers to an
individual who has undergone sexual reassignment of some kind,
including, but not limited to, hormone therapy or surgery."
I
Additionally, due to the sensitive issue of noun and pronoun usage
when discussing transsexual individuals, this Article refers to an
with ambiguous genitalia).
8. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing U.S. cases where a transsexual's identified sex was not
recognized).
9. Hazel Beh & Milton Diamond, Ethical Concerns Related to Treating Gender
Nonconformity in Childhood and Adolescence: Lessons From the Family Court of Australia, 15
HEALTH MATRIx 239, 239-40 n.1 (2005) [hereinafter Beh & Diamond, Ethical Concerns].
Professor Beh and Dr. Diamond explain that most people with a transsexual condition identify
themselves as unequivocally members of the sex in which they aspire to live.
Part of the issue revolves around how an individual's sex is considered. Over the years
this has evolved so that different categories can be evaluated in arriving at this
determination. Most commonly a person's sex is evaluated based on chromosomes,
gonads, hormonal titers, internal genitalia, external genital appearance, and social
lifestyle. With increasing sophistication and knowledge, however, more factors are
being identified so that a final resolution on a person's "sex" can also involve different
gene constellations as well as brain sex. Over time an individual's primary sex
characteristic came to be regarded as the person's gonads. We now understand that an
individual's gonads may not correspond even with other features of gross anatomy or
genitalia. There is thus no universally agreed upon standard for how to assess "sex."
These discrepancies have implications over and above any grammatical matter. A
resolution of these conflicting assay methods has legal and practical effects.
Understanding such difference can account for a person being considered a male in one
state, a female in another, and an intersexed person in a third. Persons with an
intersexed or transsexual condition consider, not their gonads, but their brains and core
sense of self, as the primary consideration in the determination of sex. Currently this is
best evaluated by the individual's own admission rather than by any currently available
scientifically objective measure.
Id. (citations omitted).
10. In recent scholarly literature the terms transgender and transsexual are not
interchangeable, with the term transgender referring to persons who may or may not have
undergone hormone therapy or surgical treatments but nonetheless identify themselves as the sex
opposite of their birth-assigned sex. ANDREW N. SHARPE, TRANSGENDER JURISPRUDENCE:
DYSPHORIC BODIES OF LAW 1-2 (2002).
11. Id. In his book, Sharpe uses the word transgender as a term not of unlimited scope but as
a term of self-description, and he uses transsexual as a medico-legal term. Id. at 2. Sharpe
recognizes that the transgender community utilizes the term "transgender" to include those people
who identify as both, neither, or something other than male or female in an attempt to deconstruct
the rigid binary sex classification system utilized in society. Id. at 1-2. In order to facilitate ease
of reading, understanding, and consistency, this Article uses the term transsexual.
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individual's sex as the sex in which they aspire to live, or their
identified sex. 12  It is with this frame of reference that this article
proceeds.
Part II of this Article examines the medical and legal background of
transsexual individuals, reviewing important medical concepts, past
court decisions, and the Illinois Vital Records Act. 13 Part III introduces
the case providing the backdrop for this article, In re Marriage of
Simmons, involving a transsexual man who married and raised a child
with his wife and subsequently had his parental rights terminated during
divorce proceedings when an Illinois court ruled the marriage invalid as
a same-sex marriage. 14 Part Ill then discusses the circuit and appellate
court decisions in Simmons. 15 Part IV analyzes the Simmons decisions
in light of the background discussed in Part 11.16 Finally, Part V
proposes that states promulgate statutes allowing for a court order
recognizing a transsexual's identified sex.
17
II. BACKGROUND
Generally, society assumes that every human being is either male or
female. 18 The criteria used to classify a person as either male or female
appears to be so self-evident as to make the classification trivial.1 9
However, when considering the list of items that differentiate male from
a female, no one characteristic is true of only one sex always and
without exception.20  The overlap in characteristics translates into
12. See Beh & Diamond, Ethical Concerns, supra note 9, at 239 n.1 (explaining the sensitive
issue of noun and pronoun usage when discussing transsexuality).
13. See infra Part II (discussing the medical history of transsexualism, prior cases involving
transsexual persons, and the Illinois Vital Records Act).
14. See infra Part III (discussing In re Marriage of Simmons).
15. See infra Part III.B-C (discussing the circuit court and appellate court decisions in In re
Marriage of Simmons).
16. See infra Part IV (analyzing the circuit court and appellate court decisions in In re
Marriage of Simmons).
17. See infra Part V (proposing statutes designed to allow for a court order recognizing a
transsexual's identified sex).
18. SUZANNE J. KESSLER & WENDY MCKENNA, GENDER: AN ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL
APPROACH 1 (1978). Kessler and McKenna analogize the fact that someone is a man or a woman
to the result of a coin toss. Id. A coin toss will always result in either heads or tails and the
answer is easily found by looking. Id. However, if the coin is worn, close inspection is
necessary. Id. Similarly, a person may not clearly be one gender or the other. Id. "But just as
we assume that we can determine 'heads' or 'tails' by detailed inspection (rather than concluding
that the coin has no heads or tails), we assume that we can do the same with a person's gender."
Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1-2. There are no behavioral or physical characteristics, visible, unexposed, or
normally unexamined (e.g. gonads), that always differentiate between genders. Id. For example,
[Vol. 37
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individuals that do not fall neatly into the male or female category.2 1
For example, transsexual individuals identify themselves as the sex
opposite of their birth-assigned sex because the external genitalia they
were born with and identified by at birth does not comport with their
psychological or brain sex.
22
Because society and the law rely on an individual's sex, transsexual
people face discrimination in virtually every aspect of their lives
including employment, housing, credit, marriage, parenting, military
service, law enforcement, and public accommodations, such as the
restroom.23 Discrimination and mistreatment of transsexual peoole is
retoo.24 p 5~i
not a recent phenomenon -nor are transsexuals, intersexed, or
some men wear skirts and some women have facial hair. Id.
21. See infra Part II.A.2 (describing medical conditions that cause a person to not fit into
societal norms of male or female).
Perhaps the most traumatic failure to meet our expectations of normalcy is presented
by sex errors of the body. Genital abnormalities, in particular, challenge the basic
tenets of our identities as men or women. We regard the sex we are as an eternal
verity. It lies at the core of our being and is therefore sacrosanct. One of the great
mysteries of creation, it is not to be tampered with, explored, analyzed, explained, or
questioned. To do so is to debase it. This mystification of sex leaves no room for
doubt, no place for ambiguity. The first thing asked of every new human being is
whether it is a boy or a girl. It must be one or the other. There are no additional
categories. This is an attitude fraught with value judgments.
Louis Gooren, Foreword to JOHN MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY AND RELATED
SYNDROMES, at ix (1994).
22. Milton Diamond, Sex and Gender: Same or Different?, 10 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 46, 50
(2000); see also infra Part II.A.3 (discussing brain sex theory).
23. See NAN D. HUNTER, COURTNEY G. JOSLIN & SHARON M. McGOWAN, THE RIGHTS OF
LESBIANS, GAY MEN, BISEXUALS, AND TRANSGENDER PEOPLE 171 (4th ed. 2004) (listing
different types of discrimination faced by the transsexual); see also, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines,
Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination
based on transgender status); Kirkpatrick v. Seligman, 636 F.2d 1047, 1051 (5th Cir. 1981)
(finding no violation of a state law prohibiting sex discrimination where a transsexual female was
required to wear male clothing at work); Goins v. West Group, 635 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn.
2001) (denying transsexual's claim of discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act
where she was denied the right to use the bathroom of her reassigned gender).
24. See Hymie Gordon, Ancient Ideas About Sex Differentiation, in GENETIC MECHANISMS OF
SEXUAL DEVELOPMENT 1, 2 (H. Lawrence Vallet & Ian H. Porter eds., 1979) (describing ancient
Roman writings describing abnormal sexual differentiations as portents).
[A]t Frusino, a baby was born who was the size of a four-year old. It was a wonder not
merely because of its size but because its sex, whether male or female, was uncertain.
In fact, the soothsayers summoned from Etruria said it was a disgusting and disgraceful
portent which had to be removed from Roman territory, far from contact with the earth,
and drowned in the sea. They put it alive into a chest, carried it out to sea, and threw it
overboard.
Id.
25. Intersexed individuals are persons with apparent anatomical admixtures of male and
female biological characteristics. MONEY, supra note 21, at 37.
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hermaphrodites 26 recent phenomena.27  Until the late 1990s, Title VII
claims of sex discrimination did not include transsexualism. 28 Some
federal courts have since held, however, that Title VII and other sex
discrimination statutes protect transsexual people from discrimination.
29
Regardless, courts have generally not recognized a transsexual person's
constitutional right to marry or raise children.
31
This Part introduces the key issues and concepts involved in
considering a transsexual person's right to legally marry or raise
children. 32  First, this Part outlines medical conditions associated with
sex differentiation, including the brain sex theory. 33  Next, this Part
discusses key cases in the history of transsexual legal issues in the
United States and Europe.34  Finally, this Part describes the language
and history of the Illinois Vital Records Act, the statute at the center of
the debate in Simmons.35
A. The Study of Sex Differentiation
This Part provides a background to the historical views of sex,
medical conditions associated with sex differentiation, brain sex theory,
surgical options, and the internationally recognized Harry Benjamin
International Gender Dysphoria Association Standards of Care. 36
26. True hermaphrodites have ovarian as well as testicular tissue and the diagnosis applies
irrespective of chromosomal complement. JOE LEIGH SIMPSON, DISORDERS OF SEXUAL
DIFFERENTIATION: ETIOLOGY AND CLINICAL DELINEATION 237-38 (1976).
27. See Gordon, supra note 24, at 1-32 (discussing ancient ideas about sex differentiation).
28. HUNTER, supra note 23, at 174; see, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th
Cir. 1984) (holding that Title VII does not forbid discrimination against a transsexual).
29. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (holding that harassment
based on sex stereotypes is covered by Title VII); Miles v. New York Univ., 979 F. Supp. 248,
249 (S.D.N.Y 1997) (holding Title IX prohibits sexual harassment of a transsexual woman).
30. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (speaking for the majority, Chief Justice
Warren described the freedom to marry as essential to the pursuit of happiness); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that the liberty contemplated by the Fourteenth
Amendment includes the right of the individual to marry, establish a home, and raise children).
31. See infra Part 11-III (surveying cases involving transsexuals and the right to marry).
32. See infra Part II.A-C (describing sex differentiation, the history of transsexual legal
issues, and the Illinois Vital Records Act).
33. See infra Part II.A (discussing the study of sex differentiation, brain sex theory, surgery,
and surgical standards of care).
34. See infra Part II.B (listing and summarizing legal cases in the United States and Europe
that involve transsexuals).
35. See infra Part U.C (discussing the Illinois Vital Records Act).
36. See infra Part II.A. 1-4 (examining the history of sex differentiation, medical conditions of
sex differentiation, the brain sex theory, surgical options, and the Harry Benjamin Standards of
Care).
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1. Historical Views of Sex
Sex differentiation has been recognized and studied since ancient
times. 37 Historically, the factors that determine one's sex have changed
over time; it has not always been true that genitals were the critical
determinant of an individual's sex.38 Furthermore, anthropologists have
found other societies and cultures that reject binary sex and gender
systems. 39  For example, a native Siberian tribe, the Chukchi, describe
seven ,ender categories in addition to the categories "woman" and
"man." India, ancient cultures, and some religious texts recognize a
third sex/gender status. 4 1  Also, many Native American cultures
recognize, indeed revere, a "two-spirit"-a third gender who functions
as neither male nor female.
42
Although U.S. courts currently use genital or chromosomal tests to
determine a person's sex, the medical field recognized, as far back as
the 1930s, that it was exceedingly difficult to determine sex from a
biological viewpoint.43 In a 1958 study, scientists recognized that there
37. See Gordon, supra note 24, at 13 (stating that speculations about the mechanisms of sex
differentiation are found in the ancient writings of philosophers and physicians, such as Plato).
38. See Greenberg, supra note 1, at 272-73 n.32 (explaining that during the Renaissance
people acknowledged that an individual's genitals may change over the course of one's life and
that from the late nineteenth century until World War I, the ultimate criterion for gender
assignment for hermaphrodites was the presence or absence of ovaries).
39. See id. at 275-76 & n.53 (describing several villages in the Dominican Republic that
formally recognize a third sex).
40. STEPHEN WHITTLE, RESPECT AND EQUALITY: TRANSSEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER
RIGHTS 4 (2002) ("Though individual Chukchi could choose to 'change sex' from man to
woman, there were also other genders which Chukchi could take up which do not involve a
change from one sex to another, but rather from one gender to another.").
41. Serena Nanda, The Hijras of India: Cultural and Individual Dimensions of an
Institutionalized Third Gender Role, in THE MANY FACES OF HOMOSEXUALITY:
ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR 35-54 (Evelyn Blackwood ed.,
1986). In India, the hijra is an institutionalized third gender role. Id. Hijra are neither male nor
female, but contain elements of both. Id. Greek myths include Hermaphroditus who was half-
male and half-female. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 276-77. Jewish texts include rules relating to
legal rights and responsibilities of intersexed individuals. Id.
42. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 276. "Anthropologists have documented 'two-spirits' in over
130 Native American societies . I..." d  at 276 n.59.
43. HUGH HAMPTON YOUNG, GENITAL ABNORMALITIES, HERMAPHRODITISM & RELATED
ADRENAL DISEASES 23 (1937); see, e.g., In re Marriage of Simmons, No. 98 D 13738 (Cook
County, Ill., Cir. Ct., County Dep't, Dom. Rel. Div. Apr. 8, 2003) (stating that because petitioner
still had external female genitals he was still female in the eyes of the law); Greenberg, supra
note 1, at 273 (describing how before 1968, athletic organizations examined a female athlete's
external genitalia to determine her right to participate in sports as a female, and recounting the
story of Maria Patino, a Spanish hurdler with Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (AIS) whose sex
verification test revealed a chromosomal make-up of a male (XY) even though her external
morphologic sex, phenotype, and self-identification were clearly female).
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was more than one criterion to identify sex.44  The study described
seven criteria of sex-five organic and two psychologic: (i)
chromosomal arrangement; (ii) gonadal structure; (iii) morphology of
the external genitalia; (vi) morphology of the internal genitalia; (v)
hormonal status; (vi) sex of rearing; and (vii) gender role of the
individual .45
In 1968, a psychologist, John Money, identified ten developmental
variables of sex: 46 (i) genetic or chromosomal sex;4 7 (ii) gonadal sex;4 8
(iii) fetal hormonal sex; 49 (vi) external morphologic sex; (v) internal
morphologic sex;5 1 (vi) hypothalamic sex; 52 (vii) sex of assignment and
rearing; (viii) pubertal hormonal sex;53 (ix) gender identity and role; and
(x) procreative sex impairments. Money posited that each of these
developmental variables has its own probabilities of error or
malfunction with some errors overlapping from one variable to
another.54  Courts in the United States still reference these variables
today, and the medical community also looks to these variables when
identifying sex differentiation conditions.
55
44. JONES & ScoTr, supra note 1, at 46.
45. Id.
46. MONEY, supra note 21, at 4.
47. Genetic or chromosomal sex describes the XX(female) or XY(male) chromosomal
arrangement. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 281-82.
48. Gonadal sex refers to whether a person has ovaries or testes. Id.
49. Both males and females produce, in differing levels, androgens and estrogens. MONEY,
supra note 21, at 4. These differing levels are measured during fetal development and at puberty
to distinguish male from female. Id.
50. External morphologic sex refers to the external sexual organs-penis, scrotum, clitoris,
and labia. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 281-82.
51. Internal morphologic sex refers to internal sexual organs-seminal vesicles, prostate,
vagina, uterus, and fallopian tubes. Id.
52. The hypothalamus is connected to the pituitary gland. MONEY, supra note 21, at 59. It
sends messages to the pituitary gland to produce gonadotropins, which instruct the ovaries or
testes to produce male or female hormones. Id.
53. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (explaining fetal hormonal sex and pubertal
hormonal sex).
54. MONEY, supra note 21, at 4. According to Dr. Harry Benjamin, a recognized expert in the
field of gender identity:
"To insist that a person must live and be legally classified in accordance with his or her
chromosomal sex violates common sense as well as humanity. It reduces science to a
mere technicality and an absurd one at that."
"With the same justification, one may insist that Rembrandt's works are not paintings,
but pieces of canvas covered with paint. Accurate but asinine."
Douglas Smith, Comment, Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Law, 56 CORNELL
L. REv. 963,966 (1971) (quoting a letter from Dr. Harry Benjamin to the Cornell Law Review).
55. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing various sex differentiation conditions); see also infra Part
1.B.2 (mentioning that a recent 2005 decision referenced the same variables).
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2. Medical Conditions in Sex Differentiation
The medical community recognizes numerous conditions related to
ambiguous genitalia, non-standard chromosomes, and other situations
where biological factors are not all congruent.56 For example, XXY
Klinefelter Syndrome, Swyer Syndrome, and Turner Syndrome are
three conditions related to chromosomal irregularities. 57  XXY
Klinefelter Syndrome is a relatively common chromosomal abnormality
found in 1 in 700 to 800 males. Likely sexed at birth as male, a
person with Klinefelter's Syndrome appears to be male, but has a
female chromosomal arrangement. 59 Conversely, a person with Swyer
Syndrome has the male Y-chromosome but is missing the sex-
determining segment, preventing the development of testes. Because
of this irregularity, the fetus takes the default female path and develops
a uterus without ovaries. 6 1 Because the condition is not apparent at
birth, parents usually raise the child as a girl, even though the child has
a male chromosomal pattern. 62  Turner Syndrome is a condition in
which an individual is born with an XO chromosomal pattern that does
not fit into the XX-XY binary system.63 Occurring in approximatel
one in every 2000 births, Turner Syndrome children are raised as girls.
The primary condition related to ambiguous genitalia is
hermaphroditismus verus where both ovarian and testicular tissue is
present in the same person.6 5 Male hermaphroditism exists in genetic
males who have testicular gonadal tissue but with ambiguous external
genitalia and feminine secondary sex characteristics. 6 - Because of
predominately feminine external genitalia, a male hermaphrodite will
likely be reared as a female. On the other hand, female
hermaphrodites are genetically female with genitalia that have
56. For a more detailed discussion of biological sexual ambiguities, see Greenberg, supra note
1, at 278-91.
57. Id. at 283-84.
58. Faruk Hadziselimovic & Dale Huff, Gonadal Differentiation - Normal and Abnormal
Testicular Development, in PEDIATRIC GENDER ASSIGNMENT: A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL 15, 18
(Stephen A. Zderic et al. eds., 2002).
59. JONES & SCOTT, supra note 1, at 80-81.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 284.
64. Turner Syndrome Society of the United States, http://www.tumer-syndrome-us.org/about/
(last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
65. JONES & SCOTT, supra note 1, at 91.
66. Id. at 139.
67. Id. at 139-40.
20061
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masculine characteristics although they have internal female organs. 68
In addition to the above conditions, numerous other sexually
anomalous conditions exist. 69  The incidence of intersexuality, where
individuals have either ambiguous or noncongruent sex features, may be
as high as two to four percent of live births. At a minimum, the rate is
at least one-tenth of one percent of the population. 7 1 As such, even at
the lowest rate, the statistical likelihood of an intersex condition is as
common as cystic fibrosis or Down's Syndrome. 72
But not all intersexed individuals are born with an intersex condition;
surgical construction can create an intersexed individual.73 The story of
David Reimer made national headlines, 74 spawning a best selling
7576 77book75 as well as magazine and journal articles. The case involved
a twin boy subjected to sexual reassignment surgery after a botched
circumcision mutilated his penis.78 Raised as a girl, David recounts that
he always felt he was not a girl. 79  David's case is perhaps the most
recognized, but it is not an isolated case. Medical conditions related
to sex differentiation and situations like David Reimer show that
68. See id. at 181-275 (describing female hermaphroditism due to congenital adrenal
hyperplasia and female hermaphroditism without virilization, which is the development of
secondary male characteristics like facial hair that occurs in some female hermaphrodites).
69. See Greenberg, supra note 1, at 281-89 (discussing various sexually anomalous
conditions).
70. Id. at 267 n.7. For a more complete list of intersex and anomalous sexual conditions, see
id. at 278-91.
71. Id. at 267 n.7.
72. ALICE DOMURAT DREGER, HERMAPHRODITES AND THE MEDICAL INVENTION OF SEX 43
(1998).
73. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 290-93.
74. Shari Roan, The Basis of Sexual Identity; He Was a Boy, Became a Girl, and Then a Boy
Again. His Case Helps Show the Brain's Role in Gender, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1997, at El.
75. JOHN COLAPINTO, As NATURE MADE HIM: THE BOY WHO WAS RAISED AS A GIRL
(2000).
76. John Colapinto, The True Story of John/Joan, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 1997, at 55.
77. See Patricia L. Martin, Moving Toward an International Standard in Informed Consent:
The Impact of Intersexuality and the Internet on the Standard of Care, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL'Y 135 (2002) (discussing David Reimer's story).
78. See generally COLAPINTO, supra note 75 (telling the story of David Reimer).
79. Id. at center photo pages.
80. Id. at 273-274. The Urology Times discusses a case where a baby boy was reassigned to
girlhood by castration, vaginal surgery, and hormone treatment with results strikingly similar to
David Reimer's. id. Upon reaching adolescence the child demanded to be reassigned as a boy
because he did not feel he was a girl. Id. In another case, a circumcision severely damaged a
child's penis and the decision was made to turn the child into a girl. Greenberg, supra note 1, at
291. The child underwent sex reassignment surgery and the parents raised the child as a girl. Id.
Interviews at age sixteen and twenty-six indicate that she identifies as a bi-sexual female and has
recreational and occupational interests that are more typically identified with males. Id.
Transsexual Marriage Recognition
defining sex may not be as easy as the genital or chromosomal test that
courts consistently use.
81
3. Brain Sex Theory
Some argue that transsexualism is a purely psychological disorder
because transsexualism does not have a known cause or origin like other
biological conditions. 82  Others argue that transsexuals should be
included as a physical intersex syndrome like those discussed above.
83
But at the Brain Bank in the Netherlands, studies support the hypothesis
that "there is a brain sex difference between men and women, and
transsexual people have the brain sex of that gender group to which they
maintain they belong."
84
In one study from the Netherlands, researchers found that genetically
male transsexuals have a female brain structure. 5 This finding supports
the hypothesis that gender identity forms from an interaction between
the developing brain and sex hormones.
86
On the basis of this study, as well as the David Reimer case and
others like him, it appears that the brain may be more critical than the
external genitalia to psychosexual development and adaptation.
87
81. See Greenberg, supra note 1, at 292 (explaining that the medical and psychiatric
community now question their long-held beliefs and that, likewise, the law must question its
long-held assumptions about the legal definition of sex).
82. Teresa A. Zakaria, By Any Other Name: Defining Male and Female in Marriage Statutes,
3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 349, 356 (2005). The author uses the term transsexual as a person who
has a strong desire to become the opposite sex of his or her unambiguous birth sex and who
suffers not from a biological condition but from a psychological disorder. Id. The author
supports this by stating that biological conditions have a known cause or origin, psychological
disorders do not, and transsexualism does not have a known cause or origin. Id. See also THE
HARRY BENJAMIN INTERNATIONAL GENDER DYSPHORIA ASSOCIATION'S STANDARDS OF CARE
FOR GENDER IDENTITY DISORDERS, SIXTH VERSION 2, 4, 6 (2001) [hereinafter HARRY
BENJAMIN SOC], available at http://www.hbigda.org/Documents2/socv6.pdf. The Harry
Benjamin SOC explain that since 1994, transsexualism has appeared in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-Fourth Edition (DSM-IV) as Gender Identity Disorder.
Id. at 4. Although listed in the DSM-IV as a mental disorder, this is not a license for
stigmatization or deprivation of a person's civil rights. Id. at 6. "The use of a formal diagnosis is
often important in offering relief, providing health insurance coverage, and guiding research to
provide more effective future treatments." Id.
83. WHITTLE, supra note 40, at 10.
84. Id.
85. Jiang-Ning Zhou et. al., A Sex Difference in the Human Brain and its Relation to
Transsexuality, 378 NATURE 68, 68 (Nov. 2, 1995).
86. Id. (explaining that previous studies showed that the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis
(BSTc), a brain area that is essential for sexual behavior, is larger in men than women).
87. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 326; see also Roan, supra note 74 (arguing that the John/Joan
story provides stark evidence that a person's brain, not anatomy or social environment,
predetermines sexual identity).
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According to Milton Diamond, an expert on intersexed and sex-
reassigned individuals, "brain sex" is a "powerful and new approach
that will get a good deal of attention legally since it trumps all the
standard characteristics used to determine one's sex."
88
4. The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association
Standards of Care and Surgical Options for Transsexual Individuals
a. The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association
Standards of Care
The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association
(HBIGDA) publishes guidelines in the form of Standards of Care (SOC)
for the treatment of persons with gender identity disorders. 89  The
purpose of the SOC is to articulate the professional consensus about the
psychiatric, psychological, medical, and surgical management of gender
identity disorders.90 Specifically, the SOC intend to provide flexible
directions for the treatment of persons with gender identity disorders.
91
The SOC recommend that a clinician consider five elements when
dealing with a transsexual patient, including "diagnostic assessment,
psychotherapy, real-life experience, hormone therapy, and surgical
therapy," with the latter three representing a triadic therapy available to
92the transsexual. The SOC make it clear that not all patients will desire
nor require all three elements of triadic therapy.9 3  The SOC further
provide guidelines for mental health professionals to follow, including
eligibility requirements for hormone therapy or surgery. 94 However, the
SOC do not define when the process of sex reassignment is complete.
95
88. E-mail from Milton Diamond, Professor of Anatomy and Reproductive Biology,
University of Hawaii Manoa, to Katie Fletcher, Student, Loyola University Chicago School of
Law (Oct. 7, 2005) (on file with author). Dr. Milton Diamond is a professor of anatomy and
reproductive biology at the University of Hawaii Manoa. Diamond directs the John A. Bums
School of Medicine's Pacific Center for Sex and Society. Known for his research on the origins
of sexual identity, Diamond studies the experiences of intersex and sex-reassigned individuals
and challenges aspects of the practice of surgically changing the gender of infant children whose
genitalia are deformed or damaged. Pacific Center for Sex and Society Homepage,
http://www.hawaii.edu/PCSS/index.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
89. The HBIGDA is named after Harry Benjamin, M.D. (1885-1986) who was one of the first
physicians to work with gender dysphoric persons. For more information, visit the HBIGDA
website, http://www.hbigda.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
90. HARRY BENJAMIN SOC, supra note 82, at 1.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 3.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 6-14. For example, the SOC recommend that a person live full time in the identified
gender for twelve months prior to genital surgery. Id. at 7.
95. Id. at 22.
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b. Surgical Options for Transsexual Individuals
For some people with a gender identity disorder, surgery is an
effective treatment.96  The first complete male-to-female surgery
reportedly occurred in 193 1.97 Previous attempts at this surgery were
incomplete, resulting only in removal of the genitals.98 Female-to-male
sex-reassignment surgery was first reported in Germany in 1912.99
However, sex-reassignment surgery did not garner mainstream attention
until the late 1940s and early 1950s when Christine Jorgensen, an
American, underwent sex-reassignment surgery.
100
Today, many surgeries are available to the male-to-female patient and
the female-to-male patient. 10 1 However, the female-to-male patient
may be restricted in his choice of techniques by anatomical, aesthetic or
surgical considerations. 10 2 Phalloplasty-resulting in good appearance,
standing micturition, 10 3 sexual sensation, and/or coital ability-requires
separate stages of surgery and involves frequent technical difficulties
96. Id. at 18.
97. The International Transsexual Sisterhood, First Gender Changes, http://www.the-
sisterhood.net/thepinknazi/id4.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). The patient underwent castration
in 1922, followed by a penectomy and the construction of a vagina in 1931. id.
98. Id.
99. See id. (reporting that performance of the first incomplete sex-reassignment surgeries in
female-to-male patients occurred in Berlin in 1912).
100. Id.
101. Surgical options for the male-to-female include orchiectomy (surgical excisions of testis
or testes), penectomy (surgical removal of penis), vaginoplasty (plastic surgery of the vagina),
rhinoplasty (plastic surgery of the nose), blepharoplasty (plastic surgery on an eyelid especially to
remove fatty or excess tissue), clitoroplasty (clitoral reduction), labiaplasty (plastic surgery of the
labia), thyroid chondroplasty (aesthetic reduction of thyroid cartilage), suction-assisted lipoplasty
of the waist (removal of fat from the waist), and facial bone reconstruction. American Society of
Plastic Surgeons, Lipoplasty,
http://www.plasticsurgery.org/public-education/procedures/Lipoplasty.cfm (last visited Mar. 6,
2006); Laser Treatments, Labiaplasty, http://www.lasertreatments.com/labiaplasty.html (last
visited Mar. 6, 2006); Medline Plus, http://www2.merriam-webster.com/cgi-
bin/mwmednlm?book=Medical&va=[insert word] (last visited Mar. 6, 2006); PubMed,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list-uids=l 1094221
&dopt=Abstract (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
Surgical options for the female-to-male include hysterectomy (surgical removal of the uterus),
salpingo-oophorectomy (surgical incision of Fallopian tube and ovary), vaginectomy (partial or
complete surgical excision of the vagina), scrotoplasty (plastic surgery of the scrotum),
urethroplasty (plastic surgery of the urethra), phalloplasty (plastic surgery of the penis or
scrotum), metoidioplasty (clitoral release), and placement of testicular prostheses. MedLine,
http://www2.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/mwmednlm?book=Medical&va=[insert word] (last
visited Mar. 6, 2006); Metoidioplasty, http://www.brownsteinmd.com/metaidoioplasty.html (last
visited Mar. 6, 2006).
102. HARRY BENJAMIN SOC, supra note 82, at 21.
103. Micturition is the act of urination. Urination, MedicineNet,
http://www.medterms.com/scfipt/main/art.asp?articlekey=4383 (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
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that may require additional operations.104 The HBIGDA SOC
recognize that there are a variety of techniques available for penis
construction. 
105
Despite the medical community's recognition of transsexuals and the
availability of surgical options, surgery does not guarantee that
transsexuals will be legally recognized as their identified sex, as
illustrated by the cases that follow. 106
B. History of Transsexual Legal Issues
For almost forty years, courts in the United States have generally
failed to recognize a transsexual's identified sex. 10 7  The cases that
follow are divided into those that did and those that did not recognize a
transsexual's reassigned sex, illustrating the inconsistent and confusing
manner in which American law has dealt with transsexuals. 10 8  This
Part concludes with a brief look at the treatment of transsexuals under
European law. 109
1. United States: Cases Not Recognizing a Transsexual's Reassigned
Sex
In 1966, a United States court first considered the right of
transsexuals to legally change their sex in Anonymous v. Weiner
(Anonymous 1). 110 In Anonymous I, the petitioner sought to change the
sex on her birth certificate from male to female in the New York
Supreme Court.']' The court sent the petitioner's request to the
administrative agency responsible for issuance of a new birth certificate,
the Bureau of Records and Statistics of the Department of Health of the
City of New York (Bureau). 1 2 The Bureau, recognizing the possible
consequences of any decision, called upon the New York Academy of
104. HARRY BENJAMIN SOC, supra note 82, at 22.
105. Id.
106. See infra Part II.B.I (detailing court cases in which a transsexual's identified sex was not
recognized by U.S. courts).
107. Helen G. Berrigan, Transsexual Marriage: A Trans-Atlantic Judicial Dialogue, 12 L. &
SEXUALITY 87, 88 (2003).
108. See infra Part ll.B.1-2 (discussing cases heard in U.S. courts).
109. See infra Part II.B.3 (briefly discussing European law and a recent case heard in the
European Court of Human Rights).
110. 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
Ill. Id. at 320. The court noted that the petitioner had undergone surgery and had "assumed
the name and role of a female in our society." Id. at 321.
112. Id. at 321. Petitioner was not asking for an amended birth certificate for the purpose of
marriage. Id. The New York Supreme Court is the trial court in New York and was not the court
acting as an appeals court in this situation. Id.
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Medicine (Academy) to study the problem and to submit its
recommendations to the Board of Health.' 13 The Committee on Public
Health of the Academy turned to a group of specialists to explore the
issue of changing transsexuals' birth certificates to reflect their
identified sex. I4
The Academy reported that it opposed a change of sex on a birth
certificate for transsexuals, reasoning that the public interest in
protection against fraud outweighed a transsexual's right to privacy.
115
After receiving the Academy's opinion, the Bureau unanimously denied
the petitioner's application for amendment or issuance of a new birth
certificate. 116  On review of the petitioner's request, the New York
Supreme Court stated that it was unable to substitute its views for those
of the administrative body in charge of maintaining the records of births
and deaths because doing so would usurp a function of the executive
branch of government. 117
More recently in 1999, in Littleton v. Prange, the Texas Court of
Appeals considered the question of a transsexual person's sex in the
context of marriage. 1 18 In Littleton, the plaintiff, a transsexual female,
married a man and filed a wrongful death suit as the surviving spouse
after her husband died. 119 The defendant doctor argued that the wife
could not be the surviving spouse because she was male and that made
the marriage void.
120
113. Id. The New York Supreme Court pointed out three reasons for the Board of Health's
investigation and the need for a formulation of policy and possible implementation by regulation.
Id. First, it "reflect[ed] the Board's awareness of its obligation to society to ensure the accuracy
of public records[;]" second, it "indicate[d] its deep concern for the individual, the transsexual[;]"
and finally, and most significant according to the court, "it representefd] adherence to the highest
standards of the administrative process." Id.
114. Id. The group included "gynecologists, endocrinologists, cytogeneticists, psychiatrists
and a lawyer." Id.
115. Id. at 322; Committee on Public Health of The New York Academy of Medicine, Change
of Sex on Birth Certificates for Transsexuals, 42 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 721, 724 (Aug. 1966).
The Academy concluded that "[m]ale-to-female transsexuals are still chromosomally males while
ostensibly females" and questioned a changed birth certificate "as a means to help a
psychologically ill person in their social adaptation." Id. Interestingly, the Academy does not
address whom the transsexual would defraud. Id.
116. Anonymous 1, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 322. The Board stated they would change a birth
certificate if there was an error but could not change a birth certificate for the reasons proposed by
this petitioner. Id.
117. Id. at 323-24 (holding that the Board's conclusion had not been proven to be arbitrary
and that the nature of the issue required judicial deference to the medical community).
118. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 223 (Tex. App. 1999). The court framed the issue as
being "[w]hen is a man a man, and when is a woman a woman?" Id. at 223.
119. Id. at 225. The couple had been married for seven years and the plaintiff's spouse was
aware of her background. Id.
120. Id.
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In determining whether the wife was a woman and the marriage was
valid, the court looked to whether any statutes recognized her legal
name change and whether the surgical and chemical changes that she
undertook were sufficient to change her sex. 12 1 The court failed to find
any statutory guidance and considered the issue as a question of law.
122
Examining state law and cases from other jurisdictions, the court
concluded that the wife was still male for the purposes of determining
the validity of her marriage and thus ruled the marriage invalid. 123 The
court reasoned that the wife was male, both anatomically and
genetically at birth, and refused to be bound by a name change on an
amended birth certificate.
124
Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court in 2002 refused to recognize a
transsexual woman's change of sex in In re Gardiner, a case in which
the surviving wife lost the right to her deceased husband's estate to her
husband's estranged son. In Gardiner, the wife had sexual
reassignment surgery in Wisconsin many years before her marriage to
the deceased. 126 Wisconsin acknowledged the sexual reassignment and
changed her birth certificate, pursuant to Wisconsin statutes.
127
However, in Gardiner, the Kansas Supreme Court declined to give full
faith and credit to the decisions of the Wisconsin courts. 128 Instead it
held that, for the purposes of marriage in the State of Kansas, the wife
was still a male and as such, her marriage to the deceased was void.
129
The Florida Court of Appeal also refused to recognize a transsexual
person's change of sex. 130 In 2004, in Kantaras v. Kantaras, the Court
of Appeal overturned a trial court decision, which found the marriage
121. Id.at229-31.
122. Id. at 225, 230.
123. Id. at 225-29, 231; see also In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Stark County, Ohio
Prob. Ct. 1987) (finding no Ohio statutory provision for a designated gender change and refusing
to validate a marriage involving a post-operative transsexual without some statutory approval
from the state legislature).
124. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230 ("We cannot make law when no law exists: we can only
interpret the written word of our sister branch of government, the legislature."). But see Goins v.
West Group, 635 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Minn. 2001) (stating that the respondent was a transgendered
person who was born a male but reassigned as a female by a Texas court in 1995).
125. In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 137 (Kan. 2002).
126. Id. at 122-23.
127. Id. at 123. Her driver's license, passport, health documents, and records at two
universities reflected she was female. Id. Also, the opinion states that a Wisconsin court drafted
an order directing the Department of Health and Social Services in Wisconsin to prepare a new
birth record. Id.
128. Id. at 134-36.
129. Id. at 136-37.
130. Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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valid, and remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider custody of
the couple's two children. 13 1 The trial court concluded that the husband
was legally a male at the time of marriage, reasoning that chromosomes
are only one factor in the determination of sex and they do not outweigh
gender or self-identity. 132  However, the Florida Court of Appeal
reversed, declaring that sex for the purpose of the Florida marriage
statutes is a question for the legislature.
2. United States: Cases Recognizing a Transsexual's Reassigned Sex
Despite the cases discussed above, there are some jurisdictions in the
United States that have recognized a transsexual's reassigned sex. 134 In
1968, just two years after Anonymous I, a similar case appeared before
the Civil Court of the City of New York. 135  The petitioner in In re
Anonymous (Anonymous II), a transsexual female, petitioned the court
for an order to change her name and sex on her birth certificate. 
136
In deciding to grant the order, the court found that the petitioner, a
post-surgical transsexual female, had to be viewed as her identified sex
because of the physiological changes she underwent in having
surgery. 137 The court emphasized that the petitioner had no chance of
sexually functioning as a male and that she functioned as a woman
because she could have a vaginal orgasm, although she could not
procreate. 138  The court further noted that a post-surgical transsexual
should be recognized as his or her identified sex just like a surgically
repaired pseudo-hermaphrodite. 139
131. Id.; see also Press Release, Nat'l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights, NCLR Announces Historic
Settlement Agreement: Transsexual Father Retains Parental Rights (June 10, 2005),
http://www.nclrights.org/releases/pr-kantaras-061005.htm (detailing the settlement reached
between the parties in Kantaras). In June 2005, a settlement was reached through arbitration
whereby the transsexual father retained all parental rights and shared legal custody of the
children. Id.
132. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 156-57.
133. Id. at 161.
134. See supra Part H.B.2 (discussing United States cases in which a transsexual's reassigned
sex has been legally recognized).
135. In re Anonymous (Anonymous II), 293 N.Y.S.2d 834, 835 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968); see
supra Part H.B.1 (discussing Anonymous 1).
136. Anonymous II, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
137. Id. at 836-38.
138. Id. at 836.
139. Id. at 837. The court explained that a child mis-sexed at birth was a
pseudohermaphrodite. Id. "Female pseudohermaphrodites may have anomalies limited to the
external genitalia" and "male pseudohermaphrodites are individuals with a Y chromosome whose
external genitalia do not develop as expected for normal males." SIMPSON, supra note 26, at 157,
183. The court then compared a pseudohermaphrodite, corrected as an infant, and the true
hermaphrodite, and posited that without corrective surgery, society would continue to classify this
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The court also responded to the Academy's fraud concern in
Anonymous I, stating that fraud is more likely when the law classifies a
person, who is apparently female, as a male. 14  The court recognized
the psychological component of a person's sex, dismissing the notion
that chromosomal arrangements determine sex.
1 4 1
Similarly, in M.T v. J. T. in 1976, the Superior Court of New Jersey
espoused an expansive view of sex in answering the question of how to
determine a person's sex for marital purposes. 142  In M.T., the court
found that the marriage between the plaintiff transsexual female, who
had surgery to remove her male sex organs and construct a vagina, and
the male defendant was valid. 
143
In validating the marriage between a male and a post-operative
transsexual female, the court saw no reason to view the plaintiff as
anything other than female because of her sex-reassignment surgery and
her capacity to function sexually as a female. 144  The court also stated
that there are several criteria or standards potentially relevant in
determining the sex of an individual, rejecting the chromosomal test of
Anonymous I as unhelpful, unrealistic, and inhumane. 
145
In 2003, the Maryland Court of Appeals 146 heard an uncontested case
in which the petitioner requested an order from the court that would
individual as his or her birth certificate sex and not the individual's true sex. Anonymous 1H, 293
N.Y.S.2d at 835. The court then likened the post-surgical transsexual with a surgically repaired
pseudohermaphrodite and asked, "[s]hould not society afford some measure of recognition to the
altered situation and afford this individual the same relief as it does the pseudo-hermaphrodite?"
Id. at 836-37.
140. Anonymous If, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 838. The court stated it was in "complete disagreement"
with the conclusion reached by the Academy. Id.
141. Id. at 838. The court supported this by stating:
A male transsexual who submits to a sex-reassignment is anatomically and
psychologically a female in fact....
Nevertheless, should the question of a person's identity be limited by the results of
mere histological section or biochemical analysis, with a complete disregard for the
human brain, the organ responsible for most function and reactions, many so exquisite
in nature, including sex orientation? I think not.
Id.
142. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 208-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). Because marriage
is only legal when between a man and a woman, the court had to determine the plaintiff's sex to
decide the legality of the marriage. Id. at 207.
143. Id. at 211.
144. Id. at 210-11. The court held that there was "no legal barrier, cognizable social taboo, or
reason grounded in public policy to prevent that person's identification at least for purposes of
marriage to the sex finally indicated." Id.
145. Id.at2lO.
146. The Court of Appeals is Maryland's highest court.
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reflect a name change and a sex-change from male to female. 147  The
lower court approved the petitioner's request for a name change but
denied the sexual identity change, holding that gender had physical
manifestations that were not subject to modification. 148 The Maryland
Court of Appeals concluded that Maryland courts could determine and
declare that a person had changed from one sex to the other, although,
in this case, the petitioner had not presented sufficient evidence of
change. 149  This case illustrates a court's willingness to recognize a
transsexual's identified sex under certain circumstances.
150
In a more recent case in 2005, In re Lovo-Lara, the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) of the Department of Justice found that a
North Carolina marriage between a post-operative transsexual female
and a foreign male was valid.151 The.BIA found the marriage valid
because a North Carolina statute allowed a person to amend his or her
birth certificate after sex-reassignment surgery and because the state
issued the parties a marriage license and registered their marriage. 
152
Although the BIA relied on state law in making its ruling, it
responded to the Department of Homeland Security's argument that
chromosomal characteristics are the definitive test for determining sex,
noting that such a claim is subject to much debate within the medical
community. 153 It further referenced eight criteria (and recognized that
they are not always congruent) typically used by medical professionals
to determine an individual's sex: (1) genetic or chromosomal sex-XY
or XX; (2) gonadal sex-testes or ovaries; (3) internal morphologic
sex-seminal vesicles/prostate or vagina/uterus/fallopian tubes; (4)
147. In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 69 (Md. 2003).
148. Id. at 69. Petitioner contended that section 4-214(b)(5) of the Health-General Article of
the Maryland Code directed the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene, upon receiving a court
order, to amend that person's Maryland birth certificate. Id. Part of the problem in this case was
that the petitioner, though a resident of Maryland, was born in Pennsylvania and courts generally
hold that they are only empowered to change birth certificates issued in their own state. Id. at 69-
70.
149. Id. at 70. The court remanded the case so that the petitioner could provide proof of
gender reassignment. Id. at 87. However, the court noted that it was not clear what, if any,
medical or legal criteria existed for determining when a complete, permanent, and irreversible
gender change occurred. Id. at 86-87. The court stated that the petitioner would bear the burden
of producing sufficient medical evidence of both the criteria for determining when a gender
change occurred and medical data showing that the petitioner completed a permanent and
irreversible change from male to female. Id. at 87.
150. Id.
151. In re Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746, 753 (B.I.A. 2005).
152. Id. at 748. The court looked to the state in which the marriage took place as the
governing and controlling law. Id.
153. Id. at 752.
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external morphologic sex-penis/scrotum or clitoris/labia; (5) hormonal
sex-androgens or estrogens; (6) phenotypic sex (secondary sexual
features)-facial and chest hair or breasts; (7) assigned sex and gender
of rearing; and (8) sexual identity. 154
The cases presented above illustrate that some U.S. courts have
acknowledged a more expansive view of a person's sex, but U.S. courts
have not reached as far as the courts in Europe. 1
55
3. European Law
In Europe, the recognition of transsexuals' right to change their birth-
assigned sex is a recent development. 156 Until 2002, Corbett v. Corbett
governed English marriage law with respect to transsexuals, holding
that an individual cannot change their birth-assigned sex. 157 However,
in I. v. United Kingdom (Case of 1) in 2002, the European Court of
Human Rights found that the United Kingdom violated Articles 8158
154. Id. Most individuals are born with the requisite 46 chromosomes-including the sex
chromosome pair of either XX or XY-and generally all eight factors are congruent with the
chromosomal pattern. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 278. However, this is not the case for
intersexed individuals, transsexuals, or others who may have any number of anomalous sexual
conditions. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing medical conditions in sex differentiation).
155. Compare supra Part II.B.I (illustrating court cases that did not recognize a transsexual's
identified sex), with supra Part II.B.2 (illustrating court cases that did recognize a transsexual's
identified sex).
156. See I v. United Kingdom (Case of 1), App. No. 25680/94, 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 967
(2002), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search
Application Number 25680/94) (recognizing the right of a transsexual to change his or her birth-
assigned sex); Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 447 (2002),
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search Application
Number 28957/95) (finding the United Kingdom in violation of the European Convention on
Human Rights by not recognizing a transsexual's identified sex); see also Berrigan, supra note
107, at 88-90 (explaining that, in July 2002, the European Court of Human Rights ordered
recognition of transsexual marriage); Robert E. Rains, Legal Recognition of Gender Change for
Transsexual Persons in the United Kingdom: The Human Rights Act 1998 and "Compatibility"
with European Human Rights Law, 33 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 333 (2005) (examining the legal
treatment of transsexuals in the United Kingdom and by the European Convention on Human
Rights).
157. Corbett v. Corbett, 2 All E.R. 33, 49 (1970); see also Case of , 36 Eur, Ct. H.R. Rep.
967 (explaining that Corbett held that sex for the purpose of marriage was to be determined by
the chromosomal, gonadal, and genital tests where these are congruent and without regard to any
surgical intervention). The Corbett case does not, however, address incongruence in the
chromosomal, gonadal, and genital tests. Corbett, 2 All E.R. at 48.
158. Article 8- Right to respect for private and family life:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interest of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
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and 12159 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Additional
Protocols when it did not recognize the petitioner's sex change.
160
In so finding, the court found no significant public interest to weigh
against the petitioner's interest in obtaining legal recognition of her sex
reassignment. 161  Nor was it apparent to the court that a person's
chromosomes, as opposed to any other factors, must determine a
transsexual's sexual identity. 
162
In its opinion, the European Court of Human Rights observed the
statutory recognition of gender reassignment in Singapore, Canada,
South Africa, Israel, Australia, and New Zealand. 163 It also noted that
54% of the contracting states to the European Convention on Human
Rights 164 permitted transsexual marriage while 14% explicitly rejected
it and the other 32% had unclear positions.
165
In contrast, the law in the United States generally determines sex
based on a person's birth-assigned sex. 16 6  While scholars in law and
other disciplines are beginning to recognize the complex and non-binary
nature of sexual categories, the law in the United States has failed to do
SO.167  Unfortunately, "[t]he hare of science and technology lurches
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 8, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230 (entered into force Sept. 3,
1953).
159. Article 12 - Right to marry: Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry
and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.
Id. art. 12,213 U.N.T.S. at 232.
160. Case of1, 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 967, 7 42, 74, 85. "Under Article 8 of the Convention
in particular, where the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the
interpretation of its guarantees, protection is given to the personal sphere of each individual,
including the right to establish details of their identity as individual human beings." Id. 170.
161. Id. [ 62, 73. The court also found no reason to deny a transsexual the right to enjoy
marriage. Id. IN 83-84.
162. Id. 62.
163. Id. 39. The court also referenced that all but two states in the United States have
statutory recognition of gender reassignment. Id.
164. The United States is not a party to the European Convention on Human Rights. Council
of Europe, http://www.coe.int/T/E/ConlAboutCoe/Memberstates/default.asp (last visited Mar.
6, 2006).
165. Case of 1, 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 967, 40. The 54% of countries that permitted
transsexual marriage included Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine. Id. The 14% that did not permit transsexual marriage
included Ireland and the United Kingdom. Id. No legislation exists in Moldova, Poland,
Romania, and Russia. Id.
166. See supra Part H.B.l (discussing U.S. cases where courts have predominantly ruled
based on a person's assigned sex at birth).
167. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 292.
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ahead [while] the tortoise of the law ambles slowly behind."'168
C. Illinois Vital Records Act
In Illinois, the Vital Records Act (Act) provides the procedures
necessary for the re-issuance of a birth certificate, which is particularly
relevant to the recognition of transsexuals and to the outcome in
Simmons. 169  The Act governs the reissuance of a birth certificate for
the purposes of adoption, legitimacy, and sex-reassignment. 17 The Act
provides, in part, that a _person may obtain a new birth certificate subject
to certain restrictions. 17 1  Specifically, the Act provides that a person
shall have a new birth certificate issued after the State Registrar receives
an affidavit from a physician stating that the physician has performed a
surgery such that the applicant's birth certificate should be changed. 1
72
The Act's legislative history relative to the issuance of a new birth
certificate after sex-reassignment only reveals that the legislature
amended the 1915 Act in 1955, adding Section 17(l)(d), allowing for
amendment of birth certificates. 173  However, in City of Chicago v.
Wilson in 1978, the Illinois Supreme Court referenced Section 17(l)(d)
of the Act and stated that the Illinois legislature authorizes the issuance
of a new birth certificate following sex-reassignment surgery. 174  In
Wilson, the Chicago police arrested two transsexuals for violating a
168. Id. at 293.
169. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/17(!)(d) (2004).
170. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/17; see also In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 752 (Ill. 1981)
(stating that the statute provides that an original birth certificate shall be sealed after an adoption);
Sullivan v. McGaw, 480 N.E.2d 1283, 1290 (Ill. App. Ct. 2nd Dist. 1985) (explaining that the
statute provides for a change in a child's birth certificate to reflect the result of a paternity test).
171. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/17(l)(d). Specifically,
(i) For a person born in this State, the State Registrar of Vital Records shall establish a
new certificate of birth when he receives any of the following:
(d) An affidavit by a physician that he has performed an operation on a person, and that
by reason of the operation the sex designation on such person's birth record should be
changed. The State Registrar of Vital Records may make any investigation or require
any further information he deems necessary.
Id.; see also infra Part IV.B (discussing the Illinois Vital Records Act in relation to the Simmons
case).
172. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/17(1)(d).
173. 1955 ILL. LAWS 1026. SENATE JOURNAL OF ILLINOIS 585, 609, 857, 888, 977, 993,
1108, 2250 (1955). The text of the Senate Journal lists only the names of the senators who
motioned and voted for the amendment. Id. But see Committee on Public Health of The New
York Academy of Medicine, Change of Sex on Birth Certificates for Transsexuals, 42 BULL.
N.Y. ACAD. MED. 721, 723-24 (Aug. 1966) (suggesting that the Illinois statute, while enacted for
hermaphrodites, allows for broader application).
174. City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 533-34 (Il. 1978).
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Chicago ordinance that prohibited a person from wearing clothing of the
opposite sex. 175  The defendants argued that they were pre-operative
transsexuals and that pre-operative therapy required that they dress in
clothes of the sex to which they were transitioning. 176  The court
balanced the government's interest in infringing on the defendants'
choice of dress and the defendants' liberty interest and found for the
defendants. 177  The court reasoned that if the Illinois legislature
implicitly allows a change of sex on a birth certificate following sex
reassignment surgery and the protocol to be followed prior to surgery
requires wearing clothing of the opposite sex, then the ordinance
infringed upon the defendants' constitutional liberty interests. 
178
Further, in 2003, the Maryland Court of Appeals referenced the
Illinois Act as a statute that allows a person who has had a sex change to
amend his or her birth certificate to reflect the change when the person
has surgery and presents an affidavit from a physician attesting to the
surgical change.' 9 While the Maryland court found that twenty-two
states, including Illinois, as well as the District of Columbia, have
statutes that allow for a change in sex on a birth certificate and twenty
states have statutes addressing amendments but not specifically sex
changes, 18 the Illinois case of In re Marriage of Simmons questions
whether Illinois courts would actually use the Illinois Vital Records Act
to allow a transsexual to change his or her sex for the purpose of
recognizing a transsexual's marriage. 181
III. DIsCUSSION
In In re Marriage of Simmons, Illinois courts, in a case of first
impression, 182 did not recognize a transsexual individual as his
identified sex in the context of marriage. 
183
175. Id. at 522.
176. Id. at 523.
177. Id. at 525.
178. Id.
179. In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 83 n.8 (Md. 2003).
180. Id. at 83-84.
181. See infra Parts Ill-V (discussing and analyzing the Simmons case).
182. Other cases in Illinois have discussed transgender legal issues. See, e.g., City of Chicago
v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 525 (I11. 1978) (finding unconstitutional, as applied to transsexual
female defendants, a Chicago ordinance that prohibited the wearing of clothing of the opposite
sex with intent to conceal wearer's sex).
183. See infra Parts II.B-C (discussing the trial court and appellate court decisions in
Simmons).
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A. Facts of In re Marriage of Simmons
Born in 1959 and sexed as female at birth, John 184 grew up as a very
masculine child.185 After being diagnosed as a male transsexual, John
started to live as a male at age nineteen and began using male hormones
at the age of twenty-one. 186  In 1991, John had surgery to remove his
internal reproductive organs. 187  Following surgery, John obtained a
new birth certificate with a sex designation as a male. 188
John and Jane Simmons met and began dating in 1984 and were
married in 1985.189 In 1991, John and Jane decided to have a child
together, using artificial insemination from an anonymous sperm
donor. 190 John, Jane, and their physician signed a contract stating, with
regard to John, "any children born from the procedure are his own
legitimate children and are heirs of his body, he waives any right to
disclaim the child, and that any children from the procedure are the
children of his own body." 19 1 John paid for the costs of the pregnancy,
including the insemination, drove Jane to doctor's appointments and
attended Lamaze classes with Jane. 192 Jane gave birth in 1992.193
In the mid 1990s, John and Jane experienced marital difficulties and
eventually separated. 194  During this separation, John maintained
184. In the interest of privacy, the litigant's actual names have been changed. "John" refers to
the petitioner husband in this case. "Jane" refers to the respondent wife.
185. In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 306 (II1. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2005).
186. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 5, Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303 (No. 1-03-2284); Simmons,
825 N.E.2d at 307.
187. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 186, at 5; Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 307. John
retains external female genitalia, although permanently altered through years of hormone therapy.
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 186, at 6; Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 307. Additionally,
there is discrepancy regarding the purpose of John's surgery. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra
note 186, at 5. John's physician wrote a letter to John's insurance company stating the surgery
was for sex reassignment. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 186, at 5. During trial, the
same physician testified that he performed the surgery because of the cancer risk associated with
long-term testosterone use. Brief and Argument of Minor-Appellant at 15, Simmons, 825 N.E.2d
303 (No. 1-03-2284). See infra note 260 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of
John's surgery).
188. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 186, at 6; Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 307.
189. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 186, at 6; Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 307.
190. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 186, at 7; Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 307.
191. Brief and Argument of Minor-Appellant, supra note 187, at 5; Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at
311.
192. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 186, at 7-8.
193. Brief and Argument of Minor-Appellant, supra note 187, at 5; In re Marriage of
Simmons, No. 98 D 13738, at 6, 1 33 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct., County Dep't, Dom. Rel. Div.
Apr. 8, 2003).
194. Brief and Argument of Minor-Appellant, supra note 187, at 9.
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custody of their child by court order. 195  The court granted Jane
supervised weekend visitation. 196  John and Jane reconciled for a
period, but in 1998, John petitioned for dissolution of the marriage. 197
B. Domestic Relations Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County
1. Trial
At the dissolution trial, both parties called numerous witnesses in
support of the dissolution and in support of their right to custody of the
child. 198 However, John sought dissolution of the marriage as a valid
marriage between a man and a woman whereas Jane sought dissolution
because the marriage was invalid as John was not male.
19
"
In support of his argument in favor of the marriage's validity, John
called an expert in sexual reassignment.200 The expert testified that
John was a male based on a physical examination. 2° 1  However, the
direct and cross-examination of the expert reflected conflicting
positions on when John became a male. 202 Initially, the expert testified
that sex reassignment occurred when John began hormone therapy,
twenty-one years earlier, but, on cross-examination, the expert opined
that sex reassignment was an ongoing process, referring to the HBIGDA
SOC and stating that there were other surgical options available to John
that cost upwards of $120,000.203 John's expert further testified that
personality determines gender and defined sexual reassignment as "any
change in the physiology or the physical makeup of an individual to
comport with the desired gender.
John also called his mother as a witness, who described John's
childhood, including his interest in traditionally male activities. 20 5 She
195. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 186, at 11.
196. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 186, at 11.
197. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 186, at 11.
198. Brief and Argument of Minor-Appellant, supra note 187, at 11-28. The trial court
decision and the appellate court opinion recite very few of the facts in this case and proceedings
at the trial. Among the available briefs, the Minor-Appellant's contains the most extensive
recitation.
199. Brief and Argument of Minor-Appellant, supra note 187, at 11-12.
200. Brief and Argument of Minor-Appellant, supra note 187, at 24.
201. Brief and Argument of Minor-Appellant, supra note 187, at 24-25.
202. Brief and Argument of Minor-Appellant, supra note 187, at 24-25.
203. Brief and Argument of Minor-Appellant, supra note 187, at 24-25; In re Marriage of
Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 309 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2005); see also supra Part Il.A.4
(discussing the Harry Benjamin Standards of Care).
204. Brief and Argument of Minor-Appellant, supra note 187, at 24.
205. Brief and Argument of Minor-Appellant, supra note 187, at 20.
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testified that John played like a boy as a child and dressed in boys' attire
since age fifteen and that she took him to apsychiatrist to help him with
his sense of being the wrong gender.2c-6  Finally, John's mother
described her son as a loving, adoring, and understanding father.20 7
Like John, Jane called an expert in sexual reassignment who testified
that John physically appeared to be male but that he had female
genitalia, female breast tissue, and a female chromosome
arrangement. 20 8  Jane also called the surgeon who performed John's
surgery in 1991.209 He testified that prior to the surgery, he knew that
John was attempting to change his gender but that, in his oimion,
John's gender-both before and after the surgery-was female.2 1e
Regarding custody of the child, all three professionals who conducted
custody evaluations for the case determined there was a strong parental
bond between John and the child and that John was a better and more
stable parent for the child than Jane.2 1 1 A court-ordered psychiatrist, a
social worker, and a Cook County Supportive Services caseworker
found that John was the better parent and that, in the best interests of the
child, John should retain physical and legal custody of the child with
visitation by Jane remaining supervised.2
206. Brief and Argument of Minor-Appellant, supra note 187, at 20.
207. Brief and Argument of Minor-Appellant, supra note 187, at 20.
208. Brief and Argument of Minor-Appellant, supra note 187, at 14-15.
209. Brief and Argument of Minor-Appellant, supra note 187, at 14-15.
210. Brief and Argument of Minor-Appellant, supra note 187, at 14-15.
211. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 186, at 8.
212. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 186, at 8-10; Brief and Argument of Minor-
Appellant, supra note 187, at 15. Specifically, the court-ordered psychiatrist's report states:
"Mr. Simmons is a good father.... His parenting has not been hindered by substance
abuse, unemployment or his own emotional instability. He does not consistently place
his son in the middle of the conflict by speaking negatively about his mother... "
"Clearly [the child] feels more comfortable with his father.... It is painful for him to
hear his mother and grandmother ridicule and denigrate his father. Ms. Simmons'
attempt to make her son 'realize that Mr. Simmons is a female' has only served to
isolate him from her and form a stronger alliance with his father who doesn't make him
feel so uncomfortable."
"Despite her best intentions, Ms. Simmons does not have the parenting skills that [the
child] needs from her.... She also has limited skills and techniques for optimal
parenting for this child. Therefore structured parenting education classes are
recommended for Mrs. Simmons."
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 186, at 9. The social worker's report states:
"Mr. Simmons... presents as a stable, loving, committed and responsible parent,....
His concerns in relation to his wife's drug use and associated behaviors seem
legitimate and appropriate, and he appears to have the child's best interests at heart.
He also appears to be willing and able to facilitate and encourage a close and
continuing relationship between the child and his mother, as long as she remains drug
free."
Transsexual Marriage Recognition
2. Circuit Court Decision
The circuit court ruled the marriage invalid as it was prohibited by
statute and contrary to public policy because it was a same-sex
marriage. 213 The court referenced several Illinois statutes that concern
marriage and make valid only marriages between a man and a
woman.
2 14
The court based its decision on its finding that John was female
before, during, and after the marriage. 215  The court acknowledged
John's transsexual claim but stated that the evidence did not support
John's assertion that he was male.216 The court went no further than
stating instead that John was born a female and continued to possess
female chromosomes, sex organs, and genitalia.
217
The court awarded custody of the child to Jane and explained its
decision by stating that there was no biological relation between John
and the child, that John had no standing as a parent, and that Jane
became pregnant after the sixth insemination procedure and not the
first. 218 According to the trial court, Illinois law requires a "separate
and specific written agreement for each artificial insemination
procedure of a wife with another man's semen for a husband to be
treated as the natural father of the child born from such a procedure."
219
The court further held that a valid agreement, such as the artificial
insemination contract signed by Jane and John, would give rights to a
husband, but because John was not Jane's husband he had no status as
husband or natural father and therefore had no legal right to custody of
the child.22°
The court also found that John lacked standing to seek custody of the
"It is strongly recommended that Mr. Simmons retain primary physical custody of the
child. He is clearly the more stable and capable parent at the present time, and with the
motivation and ability to promote an ongoing relationship between the child and his
mother."
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 186, at 10.
213. In re Marriage of Simmons, No. 98 D 13738, at 1 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct., County
Dep't, Dom. Rel. Div. Apr. 8, 2003).
214. Id. at 1-2. The court only refers to statutes that address Illinois' prohibition against
same-sex marriage, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/201, 5/212(5), 5/213(1) (2004). Id. at 2.
215. Id. at 1-2, 1-3, 8.
216. Id. at 2, N 4-8.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 6, 8 (N 34-35, 48-49, 53.
219. Id. at 7, 43. The appellate court clarified this law. In re Marriage of Simmons, 825
N.E.2d 303, 311 (111. App. Ct. I st Dist. 2005). It noted that the law came from dicta in a Fourth
District appellate court opinion, not the plain language of the statute. Id. Nevertheless, it also
found the artificial insemination agreement did not comport with the statute. Id.
220. Simmons, No. 98 D 13738, at 7, 45.
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child.221 The court explained that it had jurisdiction to decide a child
custody matter only when a parent or stepparent commences the
proceeding or, if a person other than a parent commences the
proceeding, when the child is not in the physical custody of one of his
parents. 2 2 Because Jane had physical custody of the child and the court
deemed John neither parent nor stepparent, the court ruled that John
lacked standing to seek custody of the child.223
On the matter of visitation, the court recognized a bond between John
and the child and gave John visitation rights so as not to disturb that
relationship. 224 The court referenced the best interest of the child as
well as its observation of John and the child's relationship, their bond,
and the child's desire to have a relationship with John.
225
Both John and the child appealed the trial court's decision, except the
portion regarding visitation rights.
226
C. Appellate Court of Illinois
In upholding the trial court's decision and finding that it was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate court focused
on the trial testimony of the expert witnesses who found that John still
possessed all of his female genitalia.227  The court disagreed with
John's argument that undergoing a hysterectomy and oophorectomy
removed the impediment to marriage. 28 The court stated that while
surgery removed John's internal female organs, he still possessed all of
his external female genitalia and he required additional surgeries before
the sex reassignment could be complete.
229
Further, the appellate court acknowledged but disregarded the fact
that John received a new birth certificate following surgery. 230  The
court noted that the State Registrar of Vital Records issued a new
certification without conducting any investigation. 231 In the absence of
221. Id. at 8, 53.
222. Id at 8, 49 (citing 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601 (a)(b) (2004)).
223. Id. at 8, U 51-52.
224. Id. at 10,$57.
225. Id. at 10-11,IN58-66.
226. In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 307 (111. App. Ct. I st Dist. 2005).
227. Id. at 309.
228. Id. The court recognized that parties to a marriage prohibited under 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/212 (prohibiting marriage in Illinois between two individuals of the same sex) could
validate the marriage by cohabitating after removal of the impediment to marriage. Id. at 308.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 310.
231. Id.
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any fact-finding by the State Registrar, the appellate court found that the
trial court, as a fact-finding body, could find facts that the State
Registrar did not, and ruled accordingly.
232
The Illinois Supreme Court denied John's and the child's petitions for
certiorari .233
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Circuit Court Decision
The trial court found the marriage between John and Jane invalid
based on its finding that John was female.234 The court never reached
the merits of John's arguments23 5 as the court used its finding that John
was female to derail any further discussion or analysis of any of his
arguments. 236  While the court correctly interpreted the statutes
pertinent to marriage in Illinois, requiring marriage to be between a man
and a woman, it did so with the belief that both parties were female.
237
For example, the court stated "John and Jane were both born females,
remained female at the date of the purported marriage, and continue to
be females today. They each were born with and continue to possess
female chromosomes and female genitalia." 238 The trial court refused
to consider that John was a male, blankly saying that the evidence did
not "support John's assertion that she [sic] was male."239 The trial court
232. Id.
233. Simmons v. Simmons, 839 N.E.2d 1037 (Ill. 2005).
234. In re Marriage of Simmons, No. 98 D 13738, at 1-2 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct., County
Dep't, Dom. Rel. Div. Apr. 8, 2003).
235. The only issue discussed in this Article is whether John was male or female. The other
issues brought in the case, including the Illinois Parentage and Marriage Acts, equitable estoppel,
laches, and the statute of limitations are beyond the scope of this Article. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at
310-15.
236. Id.
Consequently, the parties' purported marriage is invalid because the legislature has
determined that a marriage between two individuals of the same sex is prohibited in
Illinois. ...
Further, a valid agreement would give rights to a husband. The artificial insemination
agreement does not confer upon [John] the status of husband or natural father. As
previously found, under Illinois law, [John] was not [Jane's] husband.
The court finds that [John] has no standing to seek or assert any claim for custody and,
therefore, denies her [sic] claim for sole custody.
Simmons, No. 98 D 13738, at 2, T 9, at 7, 1 45, at 9, 1 55.
237. Id. at 1-2, i 1, 9.
238. Id. at l, 1l.
239. Id.at2, 5.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 37
determined John's sex and consequently the validity of the marriage as
a question of fact-the fact being that the trial court did not (or would
not) recognize that John could ever become male, whether through
surgery, hormone therapy, lifestyle changes, or any combination
thereof.
240
But under the Illinois Vital Records Act, a person born in the state
may have a new birth certificate issued when certain conditions exist.
2 4 1
In Simmons, John did just that following his sex reassignment
surgery. 24 2  However, the court failed to reference or to consider the
applicability of the Act.243  In the past, the Illinois Supreme Court, as
well as other state courts, has noted that the Act authorizes the issuance
of a new birth certificate after sex reassignment surgery. 244 In failing to
apply the Act or at least show why the Act should not apply, the trial
court ignored a transsexual's right to be recognized as his identified
sex.
245
Moreover, the Act's plain language clearly sustained John's
argument that he was male for the purposes of an amended birth
certificate. 2 46  A plain language reading of section 537/17(l)(d)
supported John's argument that he was male due to the hysterectomy
and oophorectomy performed in 1991. 247 The statute requires "a"
surgery; John met this requirement.
248
240. See id. at 2, 1 7 (stating that John had not been transformed from a woman to a man).
241. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/17(l)(d) (2004) (providing that the State Registrar will
issue a new birth certificate upon receiving an affidavit from a physician stating that he has
performed an operation on a person and that, because of the operation, the person's birth
certificate shall be changed to reflect the new sex designation); see also supra Part II.C
(discussing the Illinois Vital Records Act).
242. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 186, at 6.
243. Simmons, No. 98 D 13738.
244. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 533-34 (ill. 1978) (referencing the
implicit recognition of sex reassignment by the Illinois legislature); see also supra Part II.C
(discussing cases that recognize the Illinois Vital Records Act); supra note 173 and
accompanying text (stating that The New York Academy of Medicine implied that the Illinois
Vital Records Act could be applied to a wide variety of cases although it was enacted for
hermaphrodites).
245. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 373 (2000) (stating "the necessary
starting point of any exercise in statutory interpretation-the plain language of the statute.").
246. See Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 648 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("I
begin with the plain language of the statute.").
247. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 186, at 6. The HBIGDA SOC supports removal
of internal reproductive organs as sex-reassignment surgery for transsexual men. HARRY
BENJAMIN SOC, supra note 82, at 21.
248. See supra Part II.C (discussing the Illinois Vital Records Act).
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B. Appellate Court Opinion
The appellate court also failed to consider the Illinois Vital Records
Act and its effect on the Simmons case. 2 49 The appellate court reviewed
the trial court's decision that John was female under the highly
deferential "against the manifest weight of the evidence" standard used
for findings of fact. 2 5  Applying this standard of review, the appellate
court ignored the complexity of the case.
251
The Simmons case rested on a factual issue-whether for the
purposes of marriage, John was male or female.252  However, the
primary issue for resolution was legal because no legal precedent
previously existed that articulated a test for determining when a person
has achieved a sex change.2 5 3 The appellate court therefore needed to
decide what test courts would use when determining what constitutes a
legal sex change. 2 54  Whether John was male or female presented a
question of law-what legal test to use.2 55  The issue of whether John
satisfied that test was a question of fact.256  The appellate court
therefore should have applied a standard of review applicable to a
249. In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 306-10 (il. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2005).
250. Id. at 308.
251. Brief and Argument of Minor-Appellant, supra note 187, at 3-4.
252. See Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 308 (stating that the petitioner challenges the trial court
ruling that he is female); see Brief and Argument of Minor-Appellant, supra note 187, at 3
(stating that the "issue boils down to whether [John] is or was a man or a woman either at the
marriage ceremony or during the marriage" and that this is a question of fact).
253. Brief and Argument of Minor-Appellant, supra note 187, at 3-4.
254. Brief and Argument of Minor-Appellant, supra note 187, at 3-4. Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 341 requires that all appellate briefs include a section on the applicable standard of review.
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 341(e)(3). Applicable standards are based on whether the issue is one of law,
one of fact, or one of mixed law and fact. See Kelley Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and
Federal): A Primer, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 11, 21 (1994) (explaining that legal issues have
traditionally been characterized as issues of law, issues of fact or mixed issues of law and fact).
255. Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Quad Cities Open, Inc. v. City of Silvis, 804
N.E.2d 499, 505 (Il. 2004). Construction of a statute is a question of law and where the language
of a statute is clear and unambiguous a court gives effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the
language. Id. Courts construe statutes so that "each word, clause, or sentence is given reasonable
meaning and not deemed superfluous or void." Id. On appeal, questions of statutory construction
or interpretation are questions of law and therefore reviewed de novo. Id.
256. Questions of fact are reviewed under the manifest weight of the evidence. City of
Belvidere v. Ill. State Labor Relations Bd., 692 N.E.2d 295, 302 (Ill. 1998). Questions of fact
include findings of fact made by a trial judge. Corral v. Mervis Indus., Inc., 839 N.E.2d 524, 529
(Il. 2005). The typical appellate standard of review for findings of fact is manifestly erroneous.
See id. (stating that manifest error is appropriate to review findings of fact in civil actions).
Mixed questions of law and fact examine the legal effect of a given set of facts. Comprehensive
Cmty. Solutions, Inc. v. Rockford Sch. Dist., 837 N.E.2d 1, 11 (111. 2005), Decisions of mixed
questions of law and fact are clearly erroneous when the reviewing court, on the entire record,
finds that a mistake has been committed. Id.
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mixed question of law and fact.257
Instead of deferring to the trial court's finding on this complex legal
and factual issue, the appellate court should have looked to the only
possible legal test-the Illinois Vital Records Act. 258  The Act clearly
states that a person may obtain a new birth certificate, reflecting his or
her new sex, after the State Registrar of Vital Records has received
"[a]n affidavit by a physician that he has performed an operation on a
person, and that by reason of the operation the sex designation on such
person's birth record should be changed., 259 Under this standard, any
court should find that John was a male because he had an operation and
by reason of this operation his sex on his birth certificate was changed
accordingly.
260
In fact, the appellate court recognized that the State Registrar makes
decisions on when to issue new birth certificates and that the State
Registrar has the power to investigate applications for a sex designation
change. 261 However, the appellate court ignored the fact that the State
Registrar chose not to investigate John's application and instead the
court deferred to the trial court's fact-finding.2 6 2 If the appellate court
did not agree with the test used by the State Registrar to determine if a
person had satisfied the legal requirements for a sex change designation
on their birth certificate, the appropriate place for such a change is the
legislature, not the court.2
6 3
257. Under the mixed standard of review the analysis would look something like this: the rule
is the statute (an operation by reason of which the designation should be changed) and the facts
are that John had an operation (hysterectomy and oophorectomy) for the purpose of sex
reassignment. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 186, at 5.
258. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/17(l)(d) (2004).
259. Id.
260. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 186, at 6 (explaining that John had met the
requirements under the statute and had a new birth certificate issued). Notably, although the plain
language of the statute mentions operation in the singular, the court seems to demand multiple
operations (without referencing the statute, however), at least where the change is female to male.
In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 309-10 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2005). Further,
although there was some contradictory evidence as to the purpose of John's surgery, see supra
note 187 and accompanying text (discussing the contradictions), an argument can be made that
the use of testosterone was for the purpose of sex reassignment and the hysterectomy and
oophorectomy was required because of the extensive and extended testosterone use, thus leading
to the conclusion that the hysterectomy and oophorectomy were completed for the purpose of sex
reassignment. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra, note 186, at 5.
261. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 310.
262. Id.
263. Interestingly, the "Affidavit of Physician as to Change of Sex Designation" submitted by
John in 1994 asked the physician to subscribe and swear "that he/she performed certain surgical
operations on the person of [insert name], by reason of which the sex designation of the same
person should be changed from [insert gender] to [insert gender]" and to include the date and
place of surgery. Record Document Number 014592, Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303 (No. 1-03-2284)
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V. IMPACT & PROPOSAL
A. Impact of the Simmons Cases
The impact of the Simmons cases is two-fold. 264  First, on an
261individual level, John lost the right to raise his child.   John did
everything legally required in Illinois to be a husband and father,
including changing his birth certificate from female to male,
266
consenting to the artificial insemination of his wife,267 sharingarental
responsibilities, and providing for his family as a husband. But,
under current Illinois law, it is likely courts will never allow John to be
recognized as a father or to marry a female.2 69 The trial court as well as
the appellate court could not look beyond the fact that John was
genetically a female. 27  Even if John underwent genital reassignment
surgery, the court might still have ruled he was female because he was
genetically a female. 1 The trial court failed to understand the plight of
John and transsexual individuals by not acknowledging the possibility
that a person may be a sex other than what their chromosomes show.
272
Second, the future is certainly no brighter for sexually reassigned
individuals after the Simmons cases.2 73  The Illinois decisions make
clear that the rights of transsexuals will continue to be ignored,
particularly because a transsexual individual, even with a birth
certificate indicating their identified sex, may still encounter legal issues
(emphasis added). In May 2005, the Illinois Department of Health, Division of Vital Records
required a new form "Affidavit by Physician After Completion of Gender Reassignment" that
requires a physician to list the operations performed to complete gender reassignment surgery.
Illinois Department of Public Health (2005),
http://www.idph.state.il.us/vitalrecords/pdf/genderreassign.pdf. Perhaps in an attempt to prevent
fraudulent or incorrect physician affidavits, the Illinois Department of Health, Division of Vital
Records now requires more information and specific data regarding surgeries and procedures
performed in order for a person to have their sex legally changed on their birth certificate. Id.
However, the form still does not spell out what is required to guarantee that the new birth
certificate will be recognized. Id. See also HUNTER, supra note 23, at 178 (explaining that it is
not clear what constitutes a legal change of sex and that sex may be recognized for some legal
purposes but not others).
264. See infra Part V.A (discussing impact of In re Marriage of Simmons).
265. In re Marriage of Simmons, No. 98 D 13738, at 6 (Cook County, I1l., Cir. Ct., County
Dep't, Dom. Rel. Div. Apr. 8, 2003).
266. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 186, at 6.
267. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 186, at 7.
268. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 186, at 7-8.
269. In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 310 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2005).
270. Simmons, No. 98 D 13738, at 4-5, " 24-25; Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 309-10.
271. See Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 309-10 (stating that John was genetically female).
272. Id.
273. See supra Part III (discussing the Simmons decisions).
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in the courtroom.2 74  Absent a statute or enforcement of an existing
statute clearly allowing a transsexual's reassigned sex and/or court
decisions recognizing a transsexual's reassigned sex, transsexual
marriage rights with respect to their identified sex will continue to be
nonexistent. 2
75
B. Proposal
As demonstrated by John's experience, the current system in Illinois
does not work to protect transsexuals and is therefore not appropriate.
27 6
In the absence of an objective "brain sex" test, a different test is
required to determine a person's sex. 27 7 In Illinois and in the United
States as a whole, courts and legislatures should look to the precedent
set by the European Court of Human Rights and realize the importance
of human dignity and freedom.
278
In ruling that the United Kingdom had violated a transsexual's human
rights, the European Court of Human Rights found that, while there
were no definitive findings as to the causes of transsexualism, there was
also nothing to suggest anything arbitrary or capricious in the decision
taken by a person to undergo gender reassignment, diminishing any
scientific and medical evidence to the contrary. 279 The court dismissed
the chromosomal element of sex determination, and in the context of a
transsexual wishing to marry, found that legal recognition of a
transsexual's sex "should depend on a multitude of factors to be
assessed at the time of the marriage.'
280
To protect the transsexual, spouse, future children, and beneficiaries
under a will from challenges after the fact (such as the court
proceedings experienced by John), the recognition of a sex change must
be unchallengeable and irrevocable. 281 A ministerial application, such
274. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 310.
275. See infra Part V.B (advocating a proposal to remedy the inequity of the Simmons case).
276. See Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 310 (reasoning that the court can make additional findings
of fact even if the administrative agency chooses not to and overruling the administrative
agency's decision).
277. See generally KESSLER & MCKENNA, supra note 18, at 121 (explaining that transsexuals
cannot change gender, they can only change their genitals).
278. See supra Part 1l.B.3 (discussing the European Court of Human Rights' decision to
recognize a transsexual person's identified sex in the Case off).
279. Case ofl, App. No. 25680/94, 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 967, 1 61(2002).
280. Id. I 62, 64.
281. E-mail from Dr. Hazel Beh, Professor of Law, University of Hawaii Manoa William S.
Richardson School of Law, to Katie Fletcher, Student, Loyola University Chicago School of Law
(Oct. 10, 2005) (on file with author) (explaining that individuals deserve certainty in that the law
should recognize their marital and parental rights).
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as that "allowed" in Illinois, is not sufficiently adjudicatory to have the
finality that other legal proceedings enjoy. 2 82  An uncontested court
proceeding resulting in a judgment and order is required.283
Because each state could have their own sex change requirements, it
is necessary to have a uniform law to protect transsexuals when they
move from state to state.28 4  Representative experts would discuss the
particulars of a uniform standard, culminating in a recommended
standard.285 A uniform standard must specify what is required for the
law to recognize the identified sex of a transsexual individual.286
Furthermore, in light of the Simmons case, the law should not require
a female-to-male transsexual to have reconstructive phalloplasty.
287
Sex reassignment surgeons as well as the HBIGDA SOC recognize the
technical difficulties and complications of phalloplasty.
288
282. Id.
283. Id. A proceeding similar to the adoption procedure would comport with many of the
requirements to assure legal recognition of the transsexual. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL.,
WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 92 (7th ed. 2005) ("Adoption, unlike marriage, is not
revocable .... ). See also 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/17(l)(a) (2004) (allowing for a new birth
certificate to be established by the State Registrar of Vital Records upon receipt of an order of
adoption).
284. See Julie A. Greenberg & Marybeth Herald, You Can't Take It With You: Constitutional
Consequences of Interstate Gender-Identity Rulings, 80 WASH. L. REV. 819, 824 (2005) ("When
courts refuse to recognize an amended birth certificate from a sister state, they violate principles
of full faith and credit and unconstitutionally infringe upon the right to travel under the Dormant
Commerce Clause."). See also Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (stating
that in the absence of a strong public policy to the contrary, a sister state must give full faith and
credit to a final judgment rendered by an appropriate adjudicatory court from another state).
However, a standard implemented by the federal government is not advocated. Instead, states
should promulgate their own statutes relative to the issue of transsexual sex recognition,
hopefully with some uniformity.
285. "The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), now
114 years old, provides states with non-partisan, well-conceived and well-drafted legislation that
brings clarity and stability to critical areas of the law." The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ (last visited Mar. 6,
2006).
286. A Working Group on Transsexual People in the United Kingdom led to a formal
government announcement stating that it aims to publish a Bill to "give legal recognition in their
acquired gender to transsexual people who can demonstrate that they have taken decisive steps
towards living fully and permanently in the gender acquired since they were registered at birth."
Rains, supra note 156, at 393.
287. See Zakaria, supra note 82, at 380 (pointing out that proponents of sexual reassignment
surgery do not prescribe it as the treatment for every patient suffering from gender identity
dysphoria).
288. See Response Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 2-3, In re Marriage of Simmons, 825
N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2005) (No. 1-03-2284) (identifying Dr. Levine as a consulting
expert); Laurence A. Levine & Lev Elterman, Urethroplasty Following Total Phallic
Reconstruction, 160 J. UROLOGY 378, 381 (1998) (stating that creating a neophallus is
complicated by recalcitrant strictures that are prone to develop in patients with total phallic
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According to the internationally recognized HBIGDA SOC, the
treatment goal for transsexuals is psychotherapeutic, endocrine, and/or
surgical therapy, which provides lasting personal comfort with the
gendered self in order to maximize overall psychological well-being and
self-fulfillment. 28 9  In other words, the goal for a transsexual is to be
comfortable in themselves through therapy, hormone treatment, and/or
surgery. 290  These standards do not require complete sex-reassignment
surgery, particularly in female-to-male individuals.
291
In creating a legal standard that recognizes a transsexual's identified
sex, we must remember that the law is primarily concerned with human
relationships and their effects on individuals and society as a whole.
292
Accordingly, in determining a person's legal sex, the law should be
reconstruction); see also HARRY BENJAMIN SOC, supra note 82, at 22 (explaining that patients
should be fully informed that reconstructive phalloplasty requires several stages of surgery and
are subject to frequent technical difficulties often requiring additional surgeries); Gerald H.
Jordan, Total Phallic Construction, Option to Gender Reassignment, in PEDIATRIC GENDER
ASSIGNMENT: A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL 275, 276-77 (Stephen A. Zderic et al. eds., 2002)
(explaining the complications encountered after total phallic construction). Perhaps the most
reasonable reason for not requiring total phallic reconstruction comes from the psychiatrist
appointed by the trial court in the Simmons case, who stated:
Admittedly, Mr. Simmons continues to have female genitalia but, at this point, it is a
technical detail that can be resolved as surgical correction. Since it is not the custom in
our society to show one's genitalia in public and even in private, except in certain very
intimate situations, his specific genital anatomy should have little bearing on his social
activities or those of [the child]. Thus, the status of Mr. Simmons' genitals play
remarkably little role in his social or parental functioning, except to the extent that
some individuals make it an issue. He can live and parent as a male. He can be a
husband and a male friend.
Psychiatric Consult, In re Marriage of Simmons, No. 98 D 13738 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct.,
County Dep't, Dom. Rel. Div. Apr. 8, 2003) (copy on file with author).
289. See supra Part lI.A.4.a (discussing the HBIGDA SOC).
290. Id.
291. Id. See also Beh & Diamond, Ethical Concerns, supra note 9, at 282. The authors agree
with an Australian court's decision that it is unreasonable to require surgery for a sex change to
be legal, reasoning that this is inconsistent with human rights. "'The requirement is more
disadvantageous and burdensome for people seeking legal recognition of their transition from
female to male than male to female ... the requirement of surgery is a form of indirect
discrimination."' Id. at 282 (citations omitted).
The reliance on surgery, and via its use to remove a penis and consider that a sign of
maleness, disregards conditions such as the complete androgen insensitivity syndrome
(CASI), 5-alpha-reductase deficiency, and 17beta-hydroxsteroid dehydrogenase
deficiency where males are born without a penis. It similarly can wrongly categorize
conditions like congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) where females arc born with
phalluses. It denies the reality that one's brain sex is more crucial in determining
sexual and gender identity than are genitals.
Id. at 282 n.193 (citations omitted).
292. Transsexuals in Limbo: The Search for a Legal Definition of Sex, 31 MD. L. REv. 236,
241 (1971).
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most concerned with the biological factors that influence person-to-
person interactions, namely the psychology and outward appearance of
293the individual. A person's chromosomal composition and internal
anatomical structure have little direct effect on society and therefore
should not factor into the determination of a person's legal sex. 294
VI. CONCLUSION
We have made some progress towards rights for transgendered and
transsexual individuals. Some states now allow a person to legally
change the sex reflected on their birth certificate. Unfortunately, some
states still do not allow a legal sex change, nor give full faith and credit
to another state's recognition of a legal sex change, regardless of the
procedures an individual may have undergone or despite an individual
being mis-sexed at birth. As shown here by the Simmons case, even if a
person has the requisite surgery and obtains an amended birth
certificate, this may not be enough to satisfy some courts. Moreover,
though some progress has been made toward equal rights for
transgendered and transsexual individuals, the law has not kept pace
with the inequalities facing the female-to-male transsexual. The law
should not require complex surgery for a female-to-male transsexual.
The HBIGDA SOC recommends treatment goals for the transsexual
which may or may not include surgery. It is of little importance what
physical genitalia a person has between his or her legs-an area viewed
only by the most intimate of partners. The other factors discussed in
this article-gender identity, public persona, hormone levels, and
medical and psychiatric diagnoses-should suffice when a transsexual
transitions from their birth-assigned sex to their identified sex, and the
law in every state of the United States should recognize that.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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